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It is also conceivable, at least hypothetically, that human thought (in so far as it is 
itself praxis and a moment of praxis) is fundamentally the understanding of 
novelty (as a perpetual re-organisation of the given in accordance with acts 
explicable by their end). (Sartre, 1976: 61) 
 
In this chapter we will introduce a theorization of creativity which may well feel counter-
intuitive to many at first. We contend that traditional discourses and theorizations of 
creativity have unconsciously limited its very nature to a set of preconceived ideas, thus 
distancing “creativity” as a theoretical concept from the praxis of creativity. If creativity 
is a matter of “going beyond”, of exploring that which might be not so obvious and clear-
cut and of challenging the taken-for-granted, then this puts the researcher of creativity in 
something of a bind. In order to be a “creativity researcher” one needs to align oneself 
with a set of assumptions, but in order to stay “creative” (as a moment of praxis) one has 
to continuously challenge these same assumptions. In fact, in order for creativity to 
remain “creative” it, by its very nature and definition, needs to go “beyond creativity”. 
We will discuss here this ontological problem of creativity, the fact that at the very core 
of creativity lies an aporiai, a difference to itself lodged in its very being. We aim to 
show that a critical and philosophical analysis might be needed to get a grip on this 
aporia. The kind of critical analysis we want to introduce here goes by the name 
deconstruction. 
   
Deconstructing creativity?  What might this mean?  Well, we aim to do something to the 
concept of ‘creativity’, and that ‘something’ is to subject it to a process of 
‘deconstruction’ as developed by Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction is a practice rather 
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than a theory, particularly as the latter has one fundamental requirement: that of closure. 
As such it sidesteps what Rickards and De Cock (1999: 239) called the ontological 
paradox in creativity research: “How might the generative process of creativity be 
expressed within a model or theory seeking some generalizability if an essential part of 
the process is its uniqueness from that which existed before?” Deconstruction resists 
theory precisely because it demonstrates the impossibility of closure. Deconstruction 
fastens on the symptomatic points, the aporia or impasses of meaning, where texts and 
concepts get into trouble, come unstuck, offer to contradict themselves (Eagleton, 1996). 
It can be best described as a way of reading or perceiving that destabilizes an hierarchical 
order by stating what the hierarchy has suppressed. As Derrida (1981: 41) put it:   
In a traditional philosophical opposition we have not a peaceful coexistence of 
facing terms but a violent hierarchy. One of the terms dominates the other 
(axiologically, logically, etc.), occupies the commanding position. To deconstruct 
the opposition is above all, at a particular moment, to reverse the hierarchy.  
 
For Derrida dominant positions have no foundation in themselves but are sustained by 
what they differ from. Deconstruction is for Derrida ultimately a political practice, an 
attempt to dismantle the logic by which a particular system of thought maintains its force.  
What deconstruction does is the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification 
within a particular situation, text or concept. Whatever is present is not self-sustaining but 
lives on what it excludes, and by marking this difference deconstruction makes the 
excluded bounce back on the excluder (Iser, 2006). Deconstruction spotlights what the 
dominant features have relegated to absence, the articulation of which makes the 
hierarchy fall apart. The conflicts within a concept like creativity, which the hierarchical 
order is supposed to pacify, thus come to the fore again.  
 
Whilst there does not exist a commonly accepted definition of creativity, most 
commentators would agree that creativity involves the ability to come up with something 
‘new’ which is of ‘value’ or ‘useful’ (Bills & Genasi, 2003; Cox, 2005; Ford, 1996; 
Rickards & De Cock, 1999)ii. Furthermore, it is often seen as critical for organizational 
success (Elsbach & Kramer, 2003; de Brabandere, 2005; Gogatz & Mondejar, 2005; 
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Proctor, 2005).  In a deconstructive move we want to explore what this focus on ‘the 
new’, on ‘value’, and ‘organizational success’ actually suppresses. Put somewhat 
differently, it is important, in order to develop the theoretical basis of creativity, to shake 
up this ‘hierarchy’ and see where this might take us. Indeed, isn’t it so that in our reliance 
on creativity theories and models, on ever more ‘productive’ creativity techniques, we are 
actually in danger of losing “a general alertness which makes us aware, from moment to 
moment, of how the process of thought is getting caught in fixed sets of categories” 
(Bohm, 2004: 75)?  Doesn’t the obsession with ‘novelty’, with ‘frame-breaking’ and 
‘thinking outside the box’ –‘ideas’ for the sake of ‘ideas’–  suppress that what is actually 
happening under so much active and activistic energy reflects rather conservative norms: 
“compulsory individualism, compulsory ‘innovation’, compulsory performativity and 
productiveness, the compulsory valorization of the putatively new” (Osborne, 2003: 
507)?  Does the recent interest in creativity from policy makers (e.g. the 2005 Cox 
Review of Creativity in Business, commissioned by Gordon Brown, then UK Chancellor 
of the Exchequeriii and now Prime Minister) not contain a strong ideological dimension: a 
need to respond to and fit in with the perceived needs of contemporary capitalism in a 
globalized risk society?  
 
In the remainder of the chapter we want to explore the suppressed dimensions inhering in 
the notion of ‘the new’ and open up possibilities for creativity beyond the dominant neo-
liberal, market-focused ideology of ‘creativity’ as a well-behaved category and 
phenomenon. In other words, we want to reclaim creativity and take it seriously, without 
remaining fixed in a strict hierarchy of pre-suppositions and preconceived notions. To put 
it more succinctly: we want to think creatively about creativity 
 
First Deconstructive Move: Novelty and Progress 
The palpable contradiction between the absolute claim for novelty and the 
inevitable repetition, the eternal return, of the same gesture of innovation over 
and over again, does not disqualify the characterization but rather lends it a 
mesmerizing, forever perplexing and fascinating, spell... (Jameson, 2002: 125) 
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Asserting that creativity is about creating novelty may seem little more than a tautology.  
Yet, whilst it is undoubtedly true that creativity can be about creating the new, one could 
inquire whether this is assertion holds always-already. One could also question whether 
the underlying assumption of creativity as essentially linked to such beneficial novelty 
and progress is justified, or whether both these aspects are parts of an ideological 
construction geared at normalizing and accentuating one set of notions over others. The 
process of deconstruction aims at this kind of “picking apart”, arguing that the creation of 
unspoken hierarchies and implied necessities are in fact limitations to thought, driven by 
a particular Western desire to purify and control. In this case the object being purified and 
controlled is then creativity, the one thing one claims is beyond pure control – an inherent 
contradiction in thought. 
 
Creativity, as a concept put to the use of contemporary capitalism, emphasizes the value 
of novelty, and positions this as a primary process in the economy. If we follow the 
argument developed by Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), 
creativity is that which entrepreneurs showcase when they introduce new things into a 
market, and it is the “creative destruction” they wield that makes them such potent agents 
of change. Furthermore, it is this process of innovation that enables progress in the world, 
as witnessed in advanced technologies and economiesiv. In current versions of this 
argument (see e.g. Bills & Genasi, 2003; Cox, 2005; de Brabandere, 2005) creativity is 
presented as existing in juxtaposition with an old world/economy (that which was) and as 
forming a signaling device for the birth of something better. Put slightly differently, it is 
often stated that creativity is important because it helps deliver the new into the world. 
The assumption that the new is clearly superior to what went before has an important 
corollary: failure to move from one to the other is to be explained by ‘conservatism’, not 
to mention stupidity or straightforward ignorance (Edgerton, 2006).  In other words, the 
concept of creativity serves as a way of creating a binary along the lines of old/bad – 
new/good. Creativity, seen as a morally upstanding phenomenon, emphasizes novelty and 
through this positions the new as necessarily better than the old, thus creating one of the 
hierarchies that deconstruction aims to topple. Where such a statement might be 
understandable and quite sensible in local cases, we must question whether we are 
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prepared to accept it as a general statement. We must further ask whether it is, in fact, a 
neutral statement, but will leave this consideration to our third deconstructive movement.  
 
To create a brand new product or start a new company is obviously a creative act. At the 
same time, virtually all such acts contain at least some traces of old ideas, and this “old” 
content might in fact be quite substantial. If we look to the world of art, we see that 
creators such as Marcel Duchamp and Claes Oldenburg used already existing things – the 
ready-mades – to create high art (cf. Guillet de Monthoux, 2004), thus problematizing the 
notion of noveltyv. For them, there was no original, only an endless chain of derivatives. 
The world of the commodity had become a degraded one, in which things had been 
drained of their intrinsic value; but precisely because of this, they were now free to be put 
to all kinds of ingenious, innovatory uses. What someone like Marcel Duchamp produced 
out of this non-innovation is ultimately one of the most original forms of art of modern 
times (Eagleton, 2005). Žižek (2006) points out how Luther accomplished the greatest 
revolution in the history of Christianity thinking he was merely unearthing the truth 
obfuscated by centuries of Catholic degeneration. In cultural theory, Walter Benjamin 
emphasized the notion of ruin and remembrance as central aspects of any creative act (cf. 
Rehn & Vachhani, 2006), and in innovation studies one has long recognized that the most 
common form of innovation is incremental, i.e. one where the creative component is in 
fact the smallest part of the final product. All these facts are in themselves not ‘new’ and 
indeed some have been discussed at some length in creativity theory. Yet, this discussion 
has in almost all cases taken the form of emphasizing that it is still the new aspect, 
however minor this might be, that defines a particular act as creative.  
 
Our first deconstructive move, then, is to claim that creativity need not be about novelty. 
Even though novelty may be present in creative acts, this can in fact be a fairly minor part 
thereof. The emphasis on novelty is needed to ideologically position creativity as part of 
an economic movement and to connect it to the modernist ideology of progress. But why 
would it be essential for creativity? Creativity can also be a question of returning, going 
to the roots, getting back to basics. Creativity can be about taking away things, 
simplifying, creating by ignoring novelties. A neo-liberal ideological understanding may 
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see the new as that which creates value, but a skeptical reading of this would ask whether 
this not merely involves recasting some old ideological chestnuts and enlisting the 
concept of creativity to drive these forward. If, for instance, we look at how MIT’s John 
Maeda (2006) champions simplicity and thereby design and innovation principles that 
have been taken on board by companies such as Philips, we see that he encourages 
scaling back and reducing, rather than enhancing and adding on. Cook and Brown (1999) 
discovered that for a group of design teams at Xerox interacting with old artifacts is often 
a source of insights that are valuable in designing new technologies. The design team 
have an ‘hands on’ interaction with those artifacts that afford the recapture of those 
particular bits of knowledge associated with a particular competency, thus demonstrating. 
the generative power of the practices associated with recapturing old knowledge. Here, 
creativity is about seeing what is truly valuable and permanent in something, rather than 
adding the newfangled onto it.  
 
Thus the praxis of creativity does not necessarily underwrite the valuing of novelty over 
the already existing, as it deals mainly in achieving a goal. The reading of this process, 
however, has opted to promote novelty as the central aspect in order to achieve 
ideological goals. Our first deconstructive move thus suggests that we cannot allow the 
concept of creativity to be always-already defined by novelty, nor to fall under the 
ideological framework of progress and modernism, but instead to allow for a concept of 
creativity which says that it might at times be better to be old-fashioned. The notion of 
novelty as defining creativity is in such a reading not only analytically problematic, it is 
also uncreative as it discounts possibilities.  
 
Second Deconstructive Move: Originality and Uniqueness 
The staggering popularity of Reality TV programmes which consist simply in 
someone pottering mindlessly around his kitchen for hours on end suggests one 
interesting truth: that many of us find the pleasures of the routine and repetitive 
even more seductive than we do the stimulus of adventure. (Eagleton, 2005: 8) 
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The painter Paul Cézanne, generally considered as one of the most important innovators 
in the history of paintingvi (cf. Berger, 2001; Foster et al., 2004), demonstrated a very 
peculiar kind of ‘creativity’, one that one eschewed novelty and instead focused on work 
and repetition. As he put it himself “The quest for novelty and originality is an artificial 
need which can never disguise banality and the absence of artistic temperament” (quoted 
in Doran, 2001: 17).  What to make, for example, of Cézanne’s stubbornness in wanting 
to paint the same view of Mont Sainte-Victoire over and over again? For Cézanne the 
work of painting involved repetition, “repetition in the name not just of seeking an 
answer to something but of locating, deepening, embellishing a problem…” (Osborne, 
2003: 520). Through the Mont Sainte-Victoire landscape – because Cézanne used it over 
and over again as his raw material – one comes to see what creativity can mean (in his 
particular context).  It is what Paul Ricoeur (1998: 179) referred to as the ‘enigma of 
creation’: 
The modesty or the pride of the artist – in this case, it amounts to the same thing – 
is probably to know at this very moment how to make the gesture that every 
person should make. In apprehending the singularity of the question there is the 
sentiment of an incredible obligation; in the case of Cézanne or Van Gogh we 
know that it was overwhelming. It is as if the artist experienced the urgency of an 
unpaid debt with respect to something singular that had to be said in a singular 
manner. 
 
The explanation of creativity thus has to be sought in the process of production itself; the 
power of the paintings lies in their painting. Nothing appeared more sacred to Cézanne 
than work: “My method is to love working” (Doran, 2001: 127). He thus subscribes to 
the very Marxist notion that reality can best be approached through work, precisely 
because reality itself is a form of production. Here, we find another ideological problem. 
Many commentators on creativity insist that the reason that creativity is important is 
because it generates unique and original things, and that this in turn produces value. But 
in accepting this we have taken in a theory of value as already unchallenged and 
objectively true when this theory is in fact a hotbed of dissenting opinions (see e.g. 
Gibson-Graham, 1996). Furthermore, in the 20th and 21st centuries, historians have 
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become increasingly preoccupied with the phenomenon of repetition; not as Hegel 
described it by saying that everything in world history happens twice, but rather as Marx 
expanded this in his 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon when he corrected what Hegel 
forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce (Foster et. al, 2004). 
 
Our second deconstructive move then, would be to challenge the notion that creativity by 
necessity must contain original properties. Instead, we suggest that copying, imitation and 
mimicry, not to mention just hard (re)productive work can be just as important. For 
instance, the new realist movement in the pictorial arts (as represented, for example, by 
the Florence Academy), attempts to achieve almost photo-realism in their art, which 
positions hard work and reproduction as more critical aspects of creative work than 
originality. Similarly, one can find cases in architecture where the creator has tried to 
copy a style almost religiously, maybe adding a small twist, and presenting this as both a 
creative work and as a homage. Another example would be industrial design which tries 
to mimic natural forms (e.g. the Anglepoise task light) or bands that try to capture the 
style and image of a bygone era (blues revivals, neo-crooners). In all these examples the 
hallmark of success in a creative endeavour is that one has succeeded in copying that 
which one references: “It’s just like the old times!”, “I can’t believe this is not an 
Eames!” Exactness in mimicry can also create exquisite ironic effects, such as when 
Oscar Wilde created a new form of comedy simply by perfectly duplicating English high 
society mannerisms in print and on the stage. 
 
Such a deconstructive move would point to the fact that originality lies in the relational 
dynamics, not in the thing in itself, and thus not in creativity itself either. Originality is a 
process, not an essential characteristic. We are always constrained by both the matter we 
are forced to work with and an audience we are trying to communicate with. Edgerton 
(2006: p.84-85), for example, illustrates how car repairers in Ghana develop an intimate 
knowledge of cars and engines and how to keep them going using local materials, in the 
process transforming the cars: “Replacement gasks were made from old tyres, fuses were 
replaced by copper wire, nails were used as lock-pins… what might seem like dangerous 
and costly indifference to the rules set out in maintenance manuals was a remarkable 
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example of extreme technical artifice brought within human understanding.” Creativity 
emerges here when one produces something that paradoxically adheres to the rules of 
the game and at the same time establishes new rules. The compulsion to emphasize 
uniqueness simply reduces creativity to one of its aspects, in the interest of better fitting it 
into a preconceived structure. As the modernist notion of progress, which in neo-liberal 
discourse is ascribed to the workings of the market economy, ipso facto necessitates the 
existence of essential and replenishable originality it is obvious why this aspect of 
creativity has been emphasized, even though this points to an ideological positioning 
rather than an analytical one.  
 
Our second deconstructive turn thus involves a position where creativity might very well 
be about doing the same thing over and over again, and that things do not necessarily 
have to be original to be creative – or at least that one should not overemphasize this part 
of the binary. It might be that it is the very process of working that shows us creativity, 
rather than it being revealed in the originality of the final product. Therefore we shouldn’t 
exaggerate the role of originality or uniqueness in the definition of creativity either, as 
this reduces what creativity can be or mean. This turn, however, should be seen as much 
more radical than merely a definitional volte-face, as it points to how the productive 
nature of creativity can be (alternatively) understood.  
 
Third Deconstructive Move: Neutrality, or, Recasting the Ideology of Creativity 
It is generally accepted that both innovation and entrepreneurship depend upon and 
utilize the creative impulse. As both have been politically and ideologically cast as 
necessary for economic growth and development in post-industrial economies, creativity 
has thus become something of a poster-child for the potential inherent in the market 
economy (viz. the Cox Review of Creativity in Business). Such a positioning, however 
pleasing it might be for creativity researchers, is not uncontroversial. It assumes that 
creativity is an external, outside thing, which can be harnessed by market agents such as 
the ‘innovator’ or the ‘entrepreneur’, and thus casts creativity as both neutral and 
necessarily beneficial. There is scant if any discussion about how this casting of creativity 
has made it into a moral category, and by extension a political one.  
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Little attention has been paid to how creativity can be a negative thing, or even an 
immoral or illicit affair. Similarly, the assumption that creativity is always a joyous thing, 
the mark of a free society, and the handmaiden of contemporary capitalism has been 
seldom put into question. This assumption is remarkably strong and affects much of 
theoretical work on creativity. While it is obvious that creativity can exist in fields such 
as accounting, crime, torture or paedophilia, such negative aspects are rarely if ever 
brought up in the discussion thereon, as this would make the concept seem less bright and 
decidedly positive than in its current dominant representations. Following the same logic, 
we can ask why it would necessarily be the case that creativity is furthered and utilized 
best in market economies? 
 
In their study of blat networks in the Soviet Union, Rehn and Taalas (2004) argue that 
contrary to popular assumption the USSR may have been the most entrepreneurial 
country ever, and by extension, the most creative economy of all. In a system where even 
the simple act of buying meat was hindered by a Byzantine system of laws, regulations, 
five-year plans and a stifling bureaucracy, creativity and entrepreneurial action were not 
simply things a few special individuals engaged in, but became a necessary part of 
survival. Focusing on a system of favours and gift-exchanges known as blat, Rehn and 
Taalas discuss how the Soviet citizens would set up intricate and often highly creative 
networks of exchanges and mutual assistance in order to keep the everyday economy 
running in the undergrowth of the state-run system. For instance, a person with access to 
medicine could help a friend who in her turn knew a butcher who might need a new coat, 
which might be had from a person who had earlier got a discounted Aeroflot-ticket from 
somebody’s brother, and so on in a complex and ever-changing network of assistance. 
This obviously demanded quite a lot of creative finagling, interesting exchanges and out-
of-the-box approaches to exchanges. At the same time, such blat networks obviously 
worked against the system and were basically illegal. They might have been beneficial 
for the people taking part in them, yet siphoned off resources from the greater system and 
could be understood both as a way to make the economy more efficient and as a system 
of exploitation. Such a system can of course not be seen as neutral – our view of it is 
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inevitably tied to our views on what constitutes a “good” society. Creativity, considered 
from this perspective, is not neutral at all but part of how we ideologically construct the 
world (cf. Žižek, 2006). We can state that blat was creative or showed creativity, but 
whether this statement is seen as meaningful ultimately depends on our view of the 
world.  
 
Peculiarly enough, this reaction to the oppression of the Soviet bureaucracy can be seen 
as a fundamentally Marxist move. The hallmark of Marxism is precisely the idea that 
human beings create both the world and themselves. Bernard Williams (1977: 206) put it 
thus:  
At the very centre of Marxism is an extraordinary emphasis on human creativity 
and self-creation. Extraordinary because most of the systems with which it 
contends stress the derivation of most human activity from an external cause: 
from God, from an abstracted Nature or human nature, from permanent 
instinctual systems, or from an animal inheritance. The notion of self-creation, 
extended to civil society and to language by pre-Marxist thinkers, was radically 
extended by Marxism to the basic work processes and thence to a deeply 
(creatively) altered physical world and a self-created humanity. 
 
Our third deconstructive move, then, would be to say that creativity is not a neutral thing, 
nor a self-evidently good thing, but instead necessarily tied to a moral and ideological 
context. Maybe, instead of “creativity”, we have things like “neo-liberal creativity”, 
“late-modernist creativity”, “Marxist creativity” and so on. We might even have 
something like a neutral concept of creativity, but this would possibly have to accept 
things such as torture and systematic abuse as part of its expression. In other words, it is 
not enough to focus on praxis, we must also (echoing Sartre) think about the 
fundamentals of human thought (including the notion of ethics and how we construct the 
framework of our thinking). What deconstruction can do is to show how we (through the 
mechanisms of ideological thinking) neutralize and valorize a concept like creativity, and 
how we need to be aware of the possibilities for imbuing the concept with different 
values. The deconstructive method, which is mindful of how valorizations are turned into 
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ontological claims, can help us disentangle the sometimes muddled moral discourse of 
creativity in contemporary society. As to the question how we then would define 
creativity, we must turn one last time to Derrida:  
“The answer must each time be invented, singular, signed, and each time only one 
time like the gift of a work, a giving of art and life, unique and, right up until the 
end of the world, played back.  Given back.  To the impossible, I mean right up to 
the impossible.” (Derrida, 2001: 188) 
 
Discussing Deconstructed Creativity 
Why these deconstructive moves? What do we want to show? A critical reader could now 
challenge us and say we are merely playing a semantic game, and even suggest that we 
are draining the concept of creativity of meaning by suggesting that any-and-everything 
can be fitted into it. In one sense this latter accusation might be true. We do want to 
empty the word of its dogmatic and ideological meanings, as these in fact never can 
capture the concept of creativity in its entirety, and instead work as a form of straitjacket 
for enabling only particular types of analyses. We do not want to present a novel 
definition of creativity, but instead point to the problems with defining that which may lie 
beyond the graspable. 
 
On one level deconstruction should be a natural and normal process to all and sundry 
working in the creativity field, for it is reminiscent of many of the practical methods we 
use to develop ideas. Rule reversal, lateral thinking and all techniques working with 
interruptions or discontinuities are connected to the notion of deconstruction, even if the 
latter works on a more philosophical level. In this sense, deconstructing creativity is just a 
question of being creative about creativity, testing its borders by way of techniques used 
and prescribed by the field itself. On this level, deconstruction could even be seen as a 
sort of necessary ethics for the field of creativity studies; one that would assume that the 
field would practice what it preaches and not be afraid of “walking the talk”.  
 
Yet, there is obviously something much more radical at stake here. When one starts to 
subject the concept of creativity to such deconstructive moves something happens. The 
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familiar creativity territory becomes alien and strange and we seem to lose our bearings. 
The taken-for-granted grounding of the concept of creativity starts to look like just so 
many assumptions, created to fit nicely in with other assumptions. Creativity, from being 
a sign of humanity’s potential becomes just another word in the arsenal of politicians and 
CEOs. Rather than the nice, productive concept of good productive cheer we are left with 
a neo-liberal slogan or perhaps a Marxist rallying-cry. 
 
Our aim is not simply to suggest that creativity is always-already ideologically tainted. It 
is not more so than any other concept one cares to analyze. Instead, our interest lies in 
bringing to the fore that which is normally hidden. By valorising novelty over the pre-
existing, one turns creativity into part of a modernist narrative of unending progress and 
the necessity of continuous capitalistic development. By valorising originality, one hides 
away notions of production and work, not to mention history. By valorising creativity as 
a neutral concept, one hides away the many assumptions about ethics and the nature of 
social life that form the possibility of normalizing concepts. We cannot fully escape the 
framework within which we think, nor the context from where we think, but we must 
work on our awareness about the foundations of our thinking.  
 
In an age where creativity has been corralled into the service of both big business and the 
nation state we must be able to display a degree of intellectual honesty and show that we 
can subject even the concept of creativity to critique. Deconstruction is a technique for 
opening up concepts, subjecting them to difficult questions, and escaping the totalizing 
tendency inherent in all attempts at definition. By applying it to creativity we have tried 
to suggest possibilities for a creativity theory of tomorrow; one that would generate more 
interesting insights from, and surprising twists to, the old tales.  
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Notes 
 
i
 Aporia is a term borrowed from literary theory which indicates the impasse of an undecidable oscillation, 
as when the chicken depends upon the egg but the egg depends on the chicken (Culler, 1997, p.100). 
ii
 Ford’s (1996: 1116) definition is succinct and typical: “I define creativity as a domain-specific, subjective 
judgement of the novelty and value of an outcome of a particular action”. 
iii
 The report offered the following recommendations (p.16):  
* A nationwide programme should be introduced and supported to engage SMEs and demonstrate the 
practical benefits of applying creativity. 
* Steps should be taken to get greater understanding of creativity and innovation into the boardroom by 
recruiting people with creative experience onto company boards 
* ‘Managing creativity’ should be a topic in the Institute of Directors (IoD) Chartered Director syllabus 
* Broadcasters should take the same approach to encouraging creativity that they have recently shown 
towards enterprise. 
iv
 Schumpeter attributed his insight that capitalism is an evolutionary process to Marx, whose vision already 
comprehended the raw power of capitalism. For Schumpeter capitalism is never stationary but driven by a 
process of innovation, which is itself driven by the pursuit of profit, with profit hungry entrepreneurs in the 
driving seat. 
v
 Duchamp’s quintessential device in this respect was the readymade (e.g. bicycle wheel 1913; bottle rack 
1914; Fountain 1917), an appropriated product positioned as art.  This device allowed him to leap past old 
aesthetic questions of craft, medium and taste to new questions that were potentially ontological (“what is 
art?”), epistemological (“how do we know it?”), and institutional (“who determines it?”). His famous urinal 
(or “Fountain”) was the only one out of 2,125 works from 1,235 artists that was rejected for exhibition in 
April 1917 by the American Society of Independent Artists.  As Foster et al. (2004: 129) put it: “Never 
shown in its initial guise, Fountain was suspended in time, its questions deferred to later moments.  In this 
way it became one of the most influential objects in twentieth-century art well after the fact”. Duchamp’s 
main lesson was that no artist determines his work finally.  Not only does the viewer have a share, but 
subsequent artists also interpret a body of work, reposition it retroactively, and so carry it forward as well. 
vi
 John Berger (2001: 225-227) paid Cézanne the following homage: “Everyone is agreed that Cézanne’s 
paintings appear to be different from those of any painter who preceded him; whilst the works of those who 
came after seem scarcely comparable, for they were produced out of the profound crisis which Cézanne 
half foresaw and  helped to provoke… Cézanne, who consciously strove towards a new synthesis between 
art and nature, who wanted to renew the European tradition, in fact destroyed forever the foundation of that 
tradition by insisting, more radically as his work developed, that visibility is as much an extension of 
ourselves as it is a quality-in-itself of things.” 
